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Abstract: In this paper, I examine and then criticize the two main assumptions underlying Stephen 
Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism and its resulting consequentialist approach to reasoning strategy 
assessment, that is, (1) the rejection of truth as our main epistemic goal and (2) the relativity of any 
assessment of reasoning strategies. According to Epistemic Pragmatism, indeed, any evaluation of 
reasoning strategies is to be made in terms of their conduciveness to achieving what their users 
intrinsically value. However, since, as I will try to show, neither Stich’s argument supporting the 
dismissal of truth as our main epistemic goal nor his relativistic view on reasoning strategies’ 
assessments are well supported, I will conclude that Epistemic Pragmatism cannot provide by itself 
an adequate consequentialist framework for comparatively assessing people’s reasoning strategies 
and their epistemic merits. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last twenty years, different forms of epistemic consequentialism have 
emerged as rivals to the standard analytic way of doing epistemology. 
According to the latter, knowledge is conceived as a special kind of true belief, 
that is, justified true belief. Since belief and truth are not, strictly speaking, 
epistemological concepts – they are a psychological and respectively a semantic 
one –, the standard analytic way of doing epistemology has focused on 
justification, which is conceived as the property that distinguishes knowledge 
from mere true belief. According to standard analytic epistemologists, 
epistemology should aim to provide an appropriate analysis of the concept of 
justification and work out the conditions that beliefs must satisfy in order to 
count as justified true beliefs, that is, knowledge.1 In contrast to this position, 
some epistemic consequentialists have argued that epistemology should have a 
more practical concern. According to them, the main aim of an epistemological 
 
This paper draws on some of the arguments developed in the fourth chapter of my PhD dissertation, 
which I defended at the University of Trieste in May 2010. 
1 For a recent survey of the most relevant approaches to the analysis of knowledge in 
epistemology, see Ichikawa and Steup 2014. 
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enquiry is to determine how to properly assess and improve reasoning strategies 
of belief formation and revision by attending to their consequences (see, e.g., 
Stich 1990; Goldman 1999; Kornblith 2002; Bishop and Trout 2005). Insofar as 
these consequentialist approaches to epistemology aim to develop ways to 
evaluate people’s reasoning strategies of belief formation and revision, 
justification, which is standardly taken to be a property of belief tokens, plays (if 
any) a marginal role in their analysis.2 In their view, epistemology should shift 
to how people reason, rather than focus on the conditions for knowledge. 
However, insofar as they claim that people’s reasoning strategies have to be 
evaluated by attending to their consequences, these consequentialists theories 
have to first determine to what epistemic goal(s) reasoning strategies have to be 
directed. More generally, any epistemic consequentialist has to address the 
following questions: which is (if any) the primary epistemic goal? Is it truth? 
What else could replace truth in that role? 
In this paper, I will focus on a famous pragmatist answer to these questions 
that has been provided by Stephen Stich (1990) on the basis of his so-called 
“Epistemic Pragmatism”. My aim is to show that Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism 
cannot provide by itself an adequate consequentialist framework for evaluating 
people’s reasoning strategies. Specifically, I will argue that the two main 
assumptions underlying it, that is, (1) the rejection of truth as our main 
epistemic goal and (2) the relativity of any reasoning strategy assessment, either 
do not hold or are not well-supported. I then conclude by claiming that Stich’s 
Epistemic Pragmatism does not appear to be adequate for its purpose, that is, for 
comparatively assessing people’s reasoning strategies and their epistemic 
merits. 
 
 
2. Epistemic consequentialism and naturalism 
While in the standard analytic way of doing epistemology, focusing on the 
conditions under which a belief counts as knowledge, the epistemic subject is 
taken to be irrelevant in the process of knowledge acquisition, some recent 
consequentialist theories have placed great emphasis on the role of her 
psychological and social conditions in epistemological theorizing, since their 
target is to assess and improve reasoning strategies thanks to which people can 
form and revise their beliefs appropriately. Indeed, epistemic consequentialist 
theories, particularly those developed by Stich (1990), Goldman (1999), 
Kornblith (2002) and Bishop and Trout (2005), are interested in investigating 
 
2 Other consequentialist theories, while taking distance from the standard analytic approach to 
epistemology, are still interested in the concept of justification, holding that the justifiedness of 
one’s beliefs is to be spelled out in terms of the reliability of their generating processes (see, e.g., 
Goldman 1986; Henderson et al. 2007; Leplin 2007; Comesaña 2010; Graham 2012). 
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what reasoning strategies should be adopted by actual – not ideal – subjects, that 
is, subjects who possess a cognitive system and live in a social world, regardless 
of how we conceive them. Because of this attention for the psychological and 
social aspects involved in the process of belief formation and revision, these 
approaches to epistemology are usually classified as naturalistic (see Bishop and 
Trout 2005: 22-23, 112-118).3 In the last decades, there has been a lot of 
discussion about the appropriateness of naturalistic approaches in 
epistemological theorizing (see, e.g., Kitcher 1992; Bonjour 1994; Kornblith 
1999; Knowles 2002; Pacherie 2002). Contrary to the so-called replacement 
thesis (Kornblith 1994: 4), namely the thesis that epistemology should be set 
aside in favour of psychology, the consequentialist theories to which I am 
referring assume a moderate position about the naturalization of epistemology. 
Its supporters do not aim to replace epistemology with psychology (Quine 
1969), because, according to them, epistemology has to do with concerns about 
epistemic norms rather than with the description of epistemic performances. 
Specifically, these theories aim at developing a normative framework for 
comparatively assessing the epistemic quality of reasoning strategies in terms of 
their conduciveness to achieving certain goals. Accordingly, there is place for a 
more substantive concept of epistemic goodness, which takes into account, 
among other things, the nature and value of the goals pursued by the epistemic 
subjects. As Stich (1993: 5) has pointed out, that requires to “[…] determine 
which goal or goals are of interest for the assessment at hand”: a step which, 
according to Stich himself, is “fundamentally normative”. Indeed, an empirical 
inquiry cannot explain what people’s goals should be. 
 
 
3. Epistemic goals: truth and beyond 
According to consequentialist approaches, epistemologists have to determine 
what the epistemic goals of reasoning strategies ought to be and what reasoning 
strategies will best lead to those goals given the epistemic subjects’ cognitive 
and environmental constraints. However, whatever goal an epistemologist opts 
for, she has to explain why it matters from the epistemic point of view. 
Looking at the epistemological literature, we see that most naturalistic 
theories have maintained that truth is the most fundamental goal of our 
epistemic practices (see, e.g., Nozick 1981; Goldman 1986; Papineau 1993; 
Plantinga 1993). Leaving aside his former claim that epistemology should 
become part of psychology, for example, Quine (1986: 664-665) stated that  
 
 
3 Here I use the term “naturalistic approach” in a loose sense, without referring to a specific way 
of conceiving naturalism in epistemology. 
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naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for 
the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures. For me normative 
epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-
seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction […]. 
There is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of 
efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction. The normative here, as 
elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter 
is expressed. 
 
A well-known form of this sort of epistemic consequentialism is Goldman’s 
Reliabilism (Goldman 1986; 1999). According to him, good reasoning strategies 
should be aimed at producing true beliefs, and their outcomes can be taken to be 
justified if they come from reliable cognitive processes, that is, cognitive 
processes that generally lead to true beliefs. Accordingly, reasoning strategies 
are to be assessed by their success in leading to true beliefs. But, as Hilary 
Kornblith (2002: 123) observes 
 
how is it that truth acquires this status as our goal and confers normative 
force to the recommendations to pursue certain reasoning strategies of belief 
formation and revision, namely, those which are conducive to achieving it? 
 
In other words, why does truth matter? Two answers can be offered to this 
question. A first answer is that truth has an intrinsic value. This means that 
holding true beliefs is intrinsically valuable. A second answer is that, although 
an epistemic subject aims at having true beliefs, she does so because having true 
beliefs may be useful to attain other more valuable goals: truth as an epistemic 
goal has merely an instrumental value. According to this second view, having 
true beliefs is valuable because true beliefs help us to achieve the goals we aim 
at.4 Alternative to these two truth-centered answers, a pragmatist may replace 
truth as the main epistemic goal with more practical purposes. In particular, 
according to Stephen Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism, truth should be set aside in 
favour of other goals, such as the totality of goals people value. In Stich’s view, 
an epistemologist should consider the consequences of using this or that 
reasoning strategy with respect to their conduciveness to achieving such or such 
personal goal. 
 
 
4. Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism 
The first formulation of Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism can be found in his 
famous book The Fragmentation of Reason (1990), while some of its recent 
 
4 It is implicitly assumed that true beliefs are more conducive to valuable practical 
consequences than false beliefs are. 
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application and developments are presented in a series of papers co-authored 
with Michael Bishop, Luc Faucher and Richard Samuels (Samuels et al. 2002; 
Samuels et al. 2004). As I will try to show, Epistemic Pragmatism is grounded 
on two main assumptions, that is, (1) the rejection of truth as our main epistemic 
goal and (2) the relativity of any assessment of reasoning strategies. In this 
section, I will focus on (1) by tracking back the reasoning Stich provides in its 
support in The Fragmentation of Reason (Section 4). In the next section, I will 
turn to (2) by showing how reasoning strategies assessment is performed 
according to Epistemic Pragmatism (Section 5). 
 
4.1 Descriptive and normative cognitive pluralism 
In The Fragmentation of Reason (1990), Stich argues for what he calls 
“cognitive pluralism”. In his view, cognitive pluralism is divided into two 
theses, that is, descriptive and normative cognitive pluralism. According to 
descriptive cognitive pluralism, people differ significantly in their ways of 
reasoning, and of forming and revising beliefs. Contrary to that, a supporter of 
descriptive cognitive monism would hold that, if there are differences in how 
people reason, they will be not significant, and thereby she would conclude that 
all people reason in fundamentally the same way (Stich 1990: 13). While 
descriptive cognitive pluralism and descriptive cognitive monism are based on 
empirical considerations – they do not have any normative import –, normative 
cognitive pluralism is about the reasoning strategies people ought to use. In 
particular, this thesis holds that while people use a variety of reasoning 
strategies that significantly differ from each other, they may all be normatively 
appropriate. In opposition to that, a supporter of normative cognitive monism 
would hold that there is only one normatively appropriate way of reasoning, 
regardless of whether different people use different and sometimes competing 
reasoning strategies. According to the normative monist, you can always find 
universal criteria that distinguish between correct and faulty ways of reasoning. 
So, coming back to the general idea underlying cognitive pluralism, Stich 
maintains not only that (i) people reason in different ways but also that (ii) there 
is no single, universal normative standard for assessing which way of reasoning 
is better than another. 
To begin with (i), what is the evidence for descriptive cognitive pluralism? 
When Stich wrote The Fragmentation of Reason, he held that the main 
empirical evidence for descriptive cognitive pluralism came from studies of 
human reasoning made by cognitive psychologists such as Peter Wason, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (for a survey of these empirical studies see, e.g., 
Gilcovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002). According to Stich (1990: 7-9), this 
experimental research shows that people belonging to the same culture or 
society employ different reasoning strategies, particularly heuristics, and go on 
even when they are explained that their reasoning strategies are normatively 
Labinaz / Questioning Stephen Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism 
189 
inappropriate for the given task. This is a controversial claim, however. Nenad 
Miščević, for example, has noted that 
 
there is no variety of wrong answers given at the selection or conjunction 
tasks, and this uniformity is a testimony to the importance of the 
experimental paradigm itself. The tests have been performed on people of 
very different degrees of sophistication and age, but the biases seem to be 
uniform; they do not, at least prima facie, support any kind of descriptive 
pluralism. (Miščević 1996: 28) 
 
According to Miščević, the results of classical research on human reasoning can 
be interpreted as indicating that almost all people possess and use the same 
heuristics in order to solve reasoning problems and so, he concludes, such data 
might support, contrary to Stich’s claim, descriptive cognitive monism. 
However, in this classical research most, if not all, experimental subjects were 
Western people. At that time, no systematic research concerning people of 
different cultures was done on reasoning strategies that might really support 
descriptive cognitive pluralism. 
Since the late nineties, cognitive psychologists have produced new evidence 
that seems to support Stich’s claim. In particular, the social psychologist 
Richard Nisbett and his collaborators have conducted several psychological 
experiments to test whether “Western” and “East Asian” people think and 
reason differently when faced with the same cognitive task (see, e.g., Nisbett et 
al. 2001; Norenzayan 2002; Nisbett 2003). Their results show significant 
differences among cognitive (including reasoning) strategies used by 
Westerners and East Asians. According to their proponents, these studies 
question the idea that all people share a basic core of cognitive strategies 
regardless of their own culture and education. 
In particular, Nisbett and his collaborators characterize the cognitive 
strategies used by Westerners as being more analytic. Such a way of reasoning 
involves 
 
[…] detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to focus on 
attributes of the object to assign it to categories, and a preference for using 
rules about the categories to explain and predict the object’s behaviour. 
Inferences rest in part on the practice of decontextualizing structure from 
content, the use of formal logic, and avoidance of contradiction. (Nisbett et 
al. 2001: 293) 
 
Instead, cognitive strategies employed by East Asians are characterized as being 
more holistic. Their ways of reasoning involve 
 
[…] an orientation to the context or field as a whole, including attention to 
relationships between a focal object and the field, and a preference for 
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explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships. Holistic 
approaches rely on experience-based knowledge rather than on abstract logic 
and are dialectical, meaning that there is an emphasis on change, a 
recognition of contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a 
search for the “Middle Way” between opposing propositions. (Nisbett et al. 
2001: 293) 
 
Moreover, according to Nisbett and his colleagues, such differences between 
ways of thinking can be used as evidence that people not only use very different 
cognitive strategies, but they also differ in their beliefs about how the world is. 
Insofar as we take for granted the results of these experimental studies, Stich’s 
descriptive cognitive pluralism can be said to be vindicated.5 As said above, 
descriptive cognitive pluralism is, however, a descriptive thesis and, as it stands, 
does not necessarily lead to normative relativism about epistemic evaluation. 
The fact that people from different cultures use different reasoning strategies 
when dealing with the same reasoning problem does not mean that their 
reasoning strategies are all equally good. 
 
4.2 Normative cognitive pluralism: beyond truth as our main epistemic goal 
Why should epistemologists be interested in descriptive cognitive pluralism? 
According to Stich (1990: 74), the existence of significant differences among 
people’s cognitive strategies requires the development of a consequentialist 
framework for the comparative assessment of those cognitive strategies and 
their respective epistemic merits. This project begins with a fundamental 
question: how can epistemologists assess the different ways people reason? As 
the studies of Nisbett and his collaborators have shown, other similar questions 
can be raised: what can we say about the normative status of different systems 
of reasoning strategies such as those demonstrated by Nisbett and his 
colleagues? Is one of them objectively right and the rest of them objectively 
wrong? In supporting his normative cognitive pluralism, Stich wants to show 
that there is epistemic incommensurability between different ways people 
reason, that is, there exists no universal criterion for distinguishing between 
good and faulty ways of reasoning. In consequentialist terms, that means that 
there is no common goal that might enable us to compare reasoning strategies 
across situations as to their effectiveness. However, in order to defeat Stich’s 
relativist conclusion, a monist consequentialist might appeal to some common 
epistemic goal as a universal criterion of evaluation, and that might be the goal 
of having true beliefs. Even accepting that people of different cultures and 
 
5 Although some philosophers and psychologists have raised objections against the works of 
Nisbett and his colleagues, for the sake of the argument, I will take for granted here both Nisbett and 
his colleagues’ experimental results and their interpretations (for some of these criticisms, see, e.g., 
Huss 2004; Engel 2007; Mun Chan and K.T. Yan 2007). 
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societies reason in significantly different ways, the monist consequentialist 
would hold that all their reasoning strategies aim at truth. The best candidate as 
a epistemic goal with respect to which to comparatively assess different 
reasoning strategies would then be truth (see Section 3). These considerations 
are based on the idea that truth is the fundamental goal, either intrinsically or 
extrinsically or both, for all epistemic subjects. Against such a monistic 
epistemological position, Stich has provided two arguments aiming to show that 
having true beliefs may not be really valuable either intrinsically or 
instrumentally (Stich 1990: 101-127).  
Consider his first argument, which aims to demonstrate that the notion of 
truth (and its related interpretation function) is idiosyncratic and culturally 
bound and, as such, cannot be used as a universal standard for evaluation. On 
this view, people should not care whether their beliefs are true rather than 
TRUE*, TRUE** or TRUE*** etc. (where TRUE*, TRUE** or TRUE*** etc. 
represent plausible or counter-intuitive options alternative to “true”). The core 
of Stich’s argument rests on “the existence of a function that maps certain brain-
state tokens (including beliefs and perhaps some others) onto entities that are 
more naturally thought of in semantic terms, entities like propositions, or 
content sentences, or specifications of truth-conditions” (Stich 1990: 104). In 
other words, what Stich also calls “interpretation function” maps certain brain-
state tokens onto entities that, he assumes, can be true or false. Thus, for 
example, such interpretation function maps a brain-state token, such as a belief, 
onto the proposition “The cat is on the mat”. The interpretation function 
attributes a content to the belief, that is, that the cat is on the mat. According to 
Stich’s argument, the belief will be true if and only if the proposition “The cat is 
on the mat” (to which it is mapped) is true. However, as Stich (1990: 114) 
points out, “a function is just a mapping, and if the items in one set can be 
mapped to the items in another set in one way, they can be mapped in many 
ways”. This means that there might always be an indefinite number of possible 
interpretation functions, according to which we can map brain-state tokens, such 
as beliefs, onto propositions. Coming back to the previous example, we could 
map the belief that the cat is on the mat onto many different propositions, such 
as “The cat is on the table” or “The cat is on the table in the kitchen”. But which 
interpretation function is the right one among them? What makes it so? 
According to Stich, in characterizing the “right” interpretation function, analytic 
philosophers, such as epistemologists and philosophers of language, aim at 
examining “the judgments of the man or woman in the street about what content 
sentences or truth conditions get paired with the ordinary beliefs of ordinary 
folk” (Stich 1990: 105). In the standard analytic approach to epistemology, the 
people epistemologists refer to belong to a very definite culture and society. So, 
Stich holds, the interpretation function sanctioned by their judgments will be 
very idiosyncratic, and probably differ from that sanctioned by the considered 
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judgments of people belonging to other cultures and societies.6 According to 
this view, there are not only one but many competing interpretation functions 
and “the fact that we have inherited this idiosyncratic interpretation function 
rather than some other one is largely a matter of cultural and historical accident” 
(Stich 1991: 138). As a consequence, Stich holds that there is nothing 
intrinsically valuable in having beliefs that are mapped on true propositions 
sanctioned by the idiosyncratic interpretation function because 
 
those who find intrinsic value in holding true beliefs (rather than TRUE* 
ones, or TRUE** ones, ...) are accepting unreflectively the interpretation 
function that our culture (or our biology) has bequeathed to us and letting 
that function determine their basic epistemic value. In so doing, they are 
making a profoundly conservative choice; they are letting tradition 
determine their cognitive values without any attempt at critical evaluation of 
that tradition. (Stich 1990: 120) 
 
Stich holds that, while supporters of the standard analytic approach, who like to 
be conservative in epistemic matters, may feel their claims reinforced by that 
argument, most people, once they are led to understand what is involved in 
intrinsically valuing true belief, will realize that they do not usually do so. 
Consider now his second argument against truth as the main epistemic goal. 
Stich (1990: 121-124) not only argues that having true beliefs is not intrinsically 
valuable, he also does not find any good reason to assume that holding true 
beliefs has an instrumental value. According to him, the fact that true beliefs are 
good at achieving one’s goals does not mean that they are more valuable, 
intrinsically, than their competitors, such as TRUE* beliefs, TRUE** beliefs or 
even false beliefs. So, Stich argues that we should not focus on whether true 
beliefs that are in certain cases instrumentally valuable are good at achieving 
one’s goals, but rather whether true beliefs that are sanctioned by our 
idiosyncratic interpretation function are more valuable, intrinsically, than those 
assumed to be true by other competing interpretation functions. If these 
alternative options give rise to different advice about what to do in a given 
situation and so lead to take different courses of action, they might prove to be 
more valuable, instrumentally, than our idiosyncratic notion of truth. Stich 
makes reference to one example about one’s survival where having true beliefs 
turns out to be less useful than having false beliefs (Stich 1990: 122). Suppose 
that a man, call him Harry, rightly believes (he has a true belief) that his plane is 
scheduled to take off at 7:45 a.m. He arrives at the airport just in time, receives 
the boarding-card at the check-in, boards the plane, but, after taking off, the 
 
6 For empirical data supporting the claim that considered judgments about philosophical 
questions, such as the Gettier problem and the problem of the reference of proper names,  differ 
among people belonging to different cultures or societies, see respectively Weinberg et al. 2001; 
Nichols et al. 2003. 
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plane goes down and crashes killing Harry. In such a case, Stich argues, having 
a not true belief, for example, that the plane is scheduled to take off at 8:15 a.m., 
would have saved Harry’s life, that is, having a not true belief would have 
helped him achieve a basic goal, that is, his survival. According to Stich, this 
example shows that having false beliefs sometimes help us to achieve our 
(fundamental) goals more than having true beliefs. He then concludes from this 
example that “[…] the instrumental value of true beliefs is far from obvious, and 
those who think that true beliefs are instrumentally valuable owe us an argument 
that is not going to be easy to provide” because “it is surely not the case that 
having true beliefs is always the best doxastic stance in pursuing goals” (Stich 
1990: 124). 
 
 
5. Stich’s consequentialist approach to reasoning strategy assessment 
If truth is not the common epistemic goal of people’s epistemic practices, and so 
cannot be used as the fundamental criterion to evaluate their reasoning 
strategies, what can? If systems of reasoning of different cultures are 
epistemically incommensurable, how can we judge among them? Stich proposes 
to replace truth, understood as an absolute cognitive value, with an indefinite 
multiplicity of values which are relative to people’s preferences and those of the 
societies which they belong to, and which may be in competition with one 
another: 
 
if the argument about the value of truth could be sustained, the natural 
upshot for the normative theory of cognition would be a thoroughgoing 
pragmatism which holds that all cognitive value is instrumental or pragmatic 
– that there are no intrinsic, cognitive values. (Stich 1990: 21)  
 
On his pragmatist view, it is appropriate to give one’s preference to the 
reasoning strategy “that would be most likely to achieve those things that are 
intrinsically valued by the person whose interests are relevant to the purposes of 
the evaluation” (Stich 1990: 131). In other words, good reasoning strategies for 
a reasoner to employ are those that are more conducive to the state of affairs she 
considers intrinsically valuable, that is, states of affairs such as, according to 
Stich (1990: 25), those that help people to control nature or that contribute to 
improve their living conditions. In his view, reasoning strategies should be 
deemed to be cognitive tools and evaluated consequentially, that is, in terms of 
their effectiveness in attaining things which people who use them intrinsically 
value, regardless of their producing true beliefs. 
Within this pragmatist framework, it is possible to better understand Stich’s 
“cognitive pluralism” (see Section 4.1). According to him, neither the goals nor 
the means to achieve those goals will be the same for all reasoners. People aim 
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at different and competing goals depending on what their desires and interests 
are, and desires and interests usually vary among persons and cultures. On this 
view, it seems impossible to find a single criterion of evaluation for assessing 
people’s reasoning strategies. So, the only method available to us for finding 
which one among the various reasoning strategies that – if Nisbett and his 
collaborators’ claims are correct – people adopt is the best one, is to use 
situational or personal standards of evaluation. In particular, according to 
Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism, reasoning strategies can only be assessed 
consequentially by examining how efficiently they are likely to satisfy one’s 
desires and personal goals, that is, by attending to their consequences.  
As highlighted in a paper by Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich and Luc 
Faucher (2004: 166), a pragmatist approach to reasoning strategy assessment 
such as that just presented is of great value since it provides a justification of 
rationality: indeed, it explains why people should aim at reasoning in a 
normatively appropriate way, that is, why we are justified in acknowledging 
normative force to the recommendation to rely on certain reasoning strategies 
rather than others. The justification is simple and clear: good reasoning is 
desirable because it helps us achieving what we intrinsically value. In other 
words, we aim at reasoning well because this is a necessary condition for 
attaining things that we intrinsically value. It is not, as many epistemologists 
maintain, our aiming at truth that by itself explains why reasoning in a 
normatively correct way matters (see Section 3); rather, it is our desire and 
interest to attain, our goals which gives normative force to the adoption of 
certain reasoning strategies. 
Let us now consider how Epistemic Pragmatism can be applied to reasoning 
strategy assessment. Stich observes that  
 
when we ask whether subjects are reasoning well, perhaps what we really 
want to know is whether their cognitive system is at least as good as any 
feasible alternative, where an alternative is feasible if it can be used by 
people operating with some appropriate set of constraints. (Stich 1990: 154) 
 
First of all, when assessing reasoning strategies, we are comparing one 
reasoning strategy to certain competitors. In this sense, no reasoning strategy is 
normatively appropriate or inappropriate in any absolute sense. In evaluating a 
given reasoning strategy, we should compare it to alternatives that are feasible 
(in contrast with any other logically possible alternative reasoning strategies). 
On this view, before any negative evaluation about a reasoning strategy is made, 
one must be sure there is an alternative that “is both pragmatically superior and 
feasible” (Stich 1990: 156). Thus, several cognitive and situational constraints 
have to be taken into account when deciding which criteria of evaluation to 
employ. But which constraints should we count as appropriate? Stich states that  
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in deciding which constraints are relevant, or which alternative cognitive 
systems we will count as feasible, we must look to our purposes in asking 
the question. Or, as William James might put it, we must ask what the “cash 
value” of the question is – what actions might we take as the result of one 
answer or another. (Stich 1990: 155)  
 
What reasoning strategies a reasoner should adopt depends upon her desires, 
goals, and preferences in various ways and whether one reasoning strategy is 
appropriate in order to successfully solve a reasoning task will always depend in 
part on what questions she wants to answer. Here it is the core of the 
consequentialist framework for assessing reasoning strategies coming from 
Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism:  
 
the pragmatic assessment of a cognitive system will be sensitive to both the 
value and the circumstances of the people using it. Thus it may well turns 
out that one cognitive system is pragmatically better than a second for me 
while the second is pragmatically better than the first for someone else. 
(Stich 1990: 25) 
 
Any assessment of a reasoning strategy should be sensitive to people’s values 
and the circumstances in which it is used (Samuels et al. 2004: 167). Starting 
from these considerations, two fundamental types of constraints can be picked 
out: (a) good reasoning is characterized in terms of its conduciveness to 
achieving one’s desires and goals; (b) reasoning strategies’ evaluations should 
be relativized to specific ranges of contexts. As to (a), we need first identify the 
goals which people value. Once these are identified, we need to determine what 
reasoning strategies best serve these goals. With regard to (b), we need to 
specify the kind of cognitive and situational constraints relative to which 
reasoning strategies’ assessments should be made. 
 
 
6. Against Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism 
In this section, I will try to show that the two main assumptions underlying 
Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism – (1) the rejection of truth as our main epistemic 
goal and (2) the relativity of any assessment of reasoning strategies – do not 
hold, or at least can be said to be not well-supported. If I am right, that is, if the 
two assumptions are flawed, then Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism itself can be 
questioned and so too the consequentialist framework for assessing reasoning 
strategies coming from it. 
 
6.1 The value of truth 
Stich rejects truth as our main epistemic goal on the grounds that, once we 
understand what truth is and compare it to some of its competitors, we should 
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accept that truth is not as valuable as we have previously thought. Here I 
consider whether Stich’s argument supporting the claim that truth is not our 
main epistemic goal has an actual impact on our way of assessing the epistemic 
quality of reasoning strategies or whether its conclusion only states a possibility. 
As we have seen in Section 4.2, Stich holds that there might be situations in 
which having beliefs that are not true (whether we call that false, TRUE*, 
TRUE**, TRUE*** etc.) is more conducive to the things which we intrinsically 
value than having true beliefs and gives only one example about such kind of 
situations. However, let us assume that these situations may occur and that there 
may exist beliefs that are not true (they may be false, TRUE*, TRUE**…, 
TRUE*** etc.) and through which we can achieve the things we intrinsically 
value more than relying on true beliefs. Following Stich’s argument, we are lead 
to assume that people who have those beliefs, sanctioned by the appropriate 
interpretation function, will have a better life in the long run (and maybe also in 
short-term). Is it really so? It seems to me that Stich needs explain what these 
alternatives to the classical notion of truth are, how they can be characterized, so 
that we can compare them with truth and thereby conclude which of them are 
better at achieving our goals. However, if we look at his theory, we can see that 
he does not give any detail about TRUTH*, TRUTH** and TRUTH***. If it is 
only logically possible that having not true beliefs is more useful than having 
true belief in order to best achieve our goals, that is not still enough to change 
our mind and prompt us to aim at having not true beliefs (true* beliefs, true** 
beliefs, false beliefs etc.). One thing is to say that these beliefs exist and are 
(maybe) identifiable; another is to say that people are able to find reliable and 
feasible strategies to arrive at those types of beliefs. But, how can we distinguish 
between these different types of beliefs? The conditional statement held by 
Stich, according to which if we had these types of beliefs, they would lead us to 
reliably achieve our goals (even if we do not know we have them), is not 
enough to make us change our reasoning strategies by replacing our notion of 
truth and its related interpretation function with an alternative one. Before 
changing our ways of reasoning, we need to know something more about what 
kind of beliefs we should aim at and, more prominently, whether our cognitive 
capacities are enough to figure out what these beliefs are and, in the case, to 
achieve them. So, it is Stich that has to show us what such alternatives to truth 
amount to: the burden of the proof is on him and the supporters of his claims. 
Furthermore, recall the example of Harry who does not achieve a basic goal, 
that is, his survival, because of his having the true belief that the plane is 
scheduled to take off at 7:45 a.m. According to Stich, in such a case Harry’s 
having a false belief about the departure time of the flight would have saved his 
life. However, it is only by accident that Harry might have saved his life by 
having a false belief. From Harry’s case, we cannot conclude that having false 
beliefs leads systematically to achieving what we intrinsically value – its 
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conduciveness to achieving things we intrinsically value is tied to the 
occurrence of particular conditions. More generally, if we want to evaluate 
which among true beliefs, true* beliefs, true** beliefs etc. it is better to have in 
order to achieve goals we intrinsically value, we should figure out what true* 
beliefs, true** beliefs etc. consist in. But, as we have seen before, Stich does not 
give us any exemplification of what true* beliefs, true** beliefs etc. amount to. 
Accordingly, we cannot detect any systematic connection between having true* 
beliefs, true** beliefs etc. and achieving goals we intrinsically value, and so we 
cannot decide whether one of them is better than true beliefs at achieving such 
goals.  
It is possible then to conclude that we have no reason to dismiss truth as our 
main epistemic goal and hence to consider it as a relevant criterion in order to 
assess the epistemic quality of a given reasoning strategy of belief formation 
and revision. However, we can take one point of Stich’s argument: it is true that 
we do not all agree on how truth should be characterized and sometimes, given 
the context where we are located, we have different intuitions about the truth-
value of a sentence (see Austin 1962: 142-145; Carston 2002; Recanati 2010). 
 
6.2 Relativism and the invariant pragmatist criterion  
The other objection that comes quite naturally up against Stich’s Epistemic 
Pragmatism is that it leads to a radical form of relativism. According to Edward 
Stein (1996: 242), such an approach, which presupposes what he calls the 
relativist picture of rationality, assumes that “what counts as rational is indexed 
to each human being, so what counts as rational is (at least potentially) different 
from each human being”. Characterized in such a way, Stich’ position leads 
directly to nihilism, giving up any attempt to distinguish between good and bad 
reasoning strategies, and so “anything goes”. So, once we accept that there is no 
external and independent standard against which to assess people’s reasoning, 
we find ourselves in a situation where epistemic anarchy rules. However, that is 
too extreme a characterization of Stich’s proposal. As seen above, he holds that 
the consequentialist approach provides criteria of evaluation, but they are 
relativized to cognitive and situational constraints. That is what Stich means 
when he speaks of reasoning strategies “used by people operating within some 
appropriate set of constraints”. Even if Stein has missed the point, however, I 
think that starting from his considerations a stronger objection can be levelled 
against the consequentialist approach to reasoning strategy assessment set by 
Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism. Indeed, one may wonder whether this approach 
is actually applicable in any situation. As argued for by Michael Bishop (2009: 
120),  
 
Stich is a pluralist about a great many things, but when it comes to 
normative, evaluative matters, he is a methodological monist. Regardless of 
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the item one is evaluating, the evaluative considerations that arise are the 
same: what is most likely to bring about those things one intrinsically 
values? 
 
The very fact that this question is always relevant may be held to provide a 
general and universal criterion for evaluating different reasoning strategies. As 
is suggested by Baghramian (2004: 176), Stich’s consequentialist approach, 
notwithstanding its professed relativism, may be therefore held not to be 
radically relativistic. Its invariant pragmatist criterion could be characterized in 
the following way: to the extent that a reasoning strategy helps people to 
achieve goals they intrinsically value, it counts as epistemically valuable. 
Clearly, although this principle seems to be universally applicable, it does not 
specify what its content is, particularly how to distinguish between valuable 
goals and those that are not and what it is for a reasoning strategy to be 
epistemically valuable, regardless of its conduciveness to achieving valuable 
goals. This underspecification can be conceived as the relativistic side of Stich’s 
invariant pragmatist criterion. But, insofar as there is no general criterion to be 
applied for comparatively assessing the epistemic value of two or more 
reasoning strategies, it is not clear how we can decide which one among them is 
better at achieving some specific goals. Furthermore, while Stich makes some 
simple examples as to what people intrinsically value, such as controlling the 
nature and having a fulfilling life, it is not so easy to understand how to detect 
the relationship between their achievement and our reliance on specific 
reasoning strategies. For example, if in a given situation two or more people are 
dealing with the same problem and in the attempt of solving it they take to be 
valuable different goals, how can we decide which one among the available 
reasoning strategies is the most epistemically valuable? It seems to me that 
insofar, according to Stich’s invariant pragmatist criterion, the epistemic value 
of a reasoning strategy is to be relativized to the achievement of what its user 
intrinsically values, the consequentialist approach set by his Epistemic 
Pragmatism appears to be very unstable. Indeed, there is a tension between 
Stich’s willingness to support a relativistic view on reasoning strategies’ 
assessments and the need for determining how such assessments are to be done. 
But, if the consequentialist approach Stich advocates cannot solve this tension, 
then it appears to be inapplicable to comparatively evaluate people’s reasoning 
strategies: while the scope of its pragmatist invariant criterion is general, such a 
criterion is not universally applicable, after all. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In opposition with the standard way of doing epistemology, some 
consequentialist theories have proposed to give a more practical scope to the 
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epistemological enquiry, holding that its main task is to assess and improve 
reasoning strategies of belief formation and revision by attending to their 
consequences. As a particular case of it, I focused on Stich’s Epistemic 
Pragmatism, according to which any evaluation of reasoning strategies is to be 
made in terms of its conduciveness to achieving what their users intrinsically 
value. In particular, I have examined and then criticized the theoretical 
background on which this consequentialist framework for the evaluation of 
reasoning strategies is grounded. As I tried to show, the two main assumptions 
underlying Epistemic Pragmatism that is, (1) the rejection of truth as our main 
epistemic goal and (2) the relativity of any reasoning strategy assessment, are 
not well-supported. On the one side, Stich’s argument supporting the claim that 
truth is not our main epistemic goal leads to the hypothetical conclusion that 
having beliefs that are not true can be more conducive to what we intrinsically 
value than having true beliefs, but, as I have tried to show, this conclusion 
seems to have no impact on our actual way of assessing people’s reasoning 
strategies. On the other side, insofar there is a tension between Stich’s 
willingness to support a relativistic view on reasoning strategies’ assessments 
and the need for determining how they are to be done, the consequentialist 
approach set by his Epistemic Pragmatism cannot come to a stable conclusion as 
to whether a certain reasoning strategy is epistemically better than another in a 
given situation. Accordingly, since neither Stich’s argument supporting the 
dismissal of truth as our main epistemic goal nor his relativistic view on 
reasoning strategies’ assessments are well supported, the consequentialist 
approach set by Epistemic Pragmatism does not seem to be adequate for its 
purpose. 
 
 
References 
AUSTIN, J.L 
1962 How to Do Things with Words, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2nd ed. rev. 1975. 
BAGHRAMIAN, M.  
2004 Relativism, Routledge, New York. 
BISHOP, M.A.  
2009 «Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity: Can a Stich in Time Save Quine?», in D. 
Murphy and M. Bishop (eds.), Stich and his Critics, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 113-136. 
BISHOP, M. AND TROUT, J. 
2005 Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford University Press, New York. 
BONJOUR, L. 
1994 «Against Naturalized Epistemology», Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19, 283-300. 
CARSTON, R.  
2002 Thoughts and utterances, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Esercizi Filosofici 10, 2016 
200 
COMESAÑA, J. 
2010 «Evidentialist Reliabilism», Noûs 94, 571–601 
ENGEL, P. 
2007 «Is there a geography of thought?», Cognitio 8, 197-222. 
GILCOVICH, T., GRIFFIN, D., AND KAHNEMAN, D. (EDS.) 
2002 Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge University Press, 
New York. 
GOLDMAN, A. 
1986 Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
1999 Knowledge in a Social World, Clarendon, Oxford. 
GRAHAM, P.J. 
2012 «Epistemic Entitlement», Noûs 46, 449–483. 
ICHIKAWA, J. AND STEUP, M. 
2014 «The Analysis of Knowledge», in E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-analysis/>. 
HENDERSON, D., HORGAN, T. AND POTRČ, M. 
2007 «Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism», Acta Analytica 22, 281-300. 
HUSS, B. 
2004 «Cultural differences and the law of noncontradiction: Some criteria for further research», 
Philosophical Psychology 17, 375-389. 
KITCHER, P. 
1992 «The Naturalists Return», Philosophical Review 101, 53–114. 
KNOWLES, J. 
2002 «Naturalised Epistemology without Norms», Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2, 281-296. 
KORNBLITH, H. 
1993 Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
1994 «Introduction: What is naturalistic epistemology?», in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing 
Epistemology, 2nd Ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1-14. 
1999 «In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology», J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell 
Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell, Malden (Mass.), 158-169. 
2002 Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, Oxford University Press, New York. 
LEPLIN, J. 
2007 «In Defense of Reliabilism», Philosophical Studies 134, 31–42. 
MIŠČEVIĆ, N. 
1996 «Should reason be fragmented», International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6, 23-36. 
MUN CHAN, H. AND K.T. YAN, H. 
2007 «Is there a geography of thought for East-West differences? Why or why not?», Educational 
Philosophy and Theory 39, 383-403. 
NETA, R.  
2008 «Naturalizing epistemology», in V. Hendrick and D. Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in 
Epistemology, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 324-353. 
NICHOLS, S., STICH, S. AND WEINBERG, J.M.  
Labinaz / Questioning Stephen Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism 
201 
2003 «Meta-skepticism: Meditations in ethno-epistemology», in S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK), 227-247. 
NISBETT, R.E.  
2003 The Geography of Thought: Why We Think the Way We Do, The Free Press, New York. 
NISBETT, R.E., PENG, K., CHOI, I. AND NORENZAYAN, A. 
2001 «Culture and systems of thought: holistic vs. analytic cognition», Psychological Review 108, 
291-310.  
NORENZAYAN, A., SMITH, E.E., KIM, B.J. AND NISBETT, R.E.  
2002 «Cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning», Cognitive Science 26, 653–84. 
NOZICK, R. 
1981 Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
PACHERIE, E.  
2002 «Naturalistic epistemologies and normativity», Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6, 299-317. 
PAPINEAU, D. 
1993 Philosophical Naturalism, Blackwell, Oxford. 
PLANTINGA, A. 
1993 Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, New York. 
QUINE, W.V.O. 
1969 «Epistemology naturalized», in W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 69-90. 
1986 «Reply to Morton White», in L.E. Hahn and P.A. Schilpp (eds.), The philosophy of W. V. 
Quine, Open Court, La Salle, 663-665. 
RECANATI F. 
2010 Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
SAMUELS, R., STICH, S., AND BISHOP, M. 
2002 «Ending the rationality wars: how to make disputes about human rationality disappear», in R. 
Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality, Oxford University Press, New York, 
236-268. 
SAMUELS, R., STICH, S., AND FAUCHER, L. 
2004 «Reason and Rationality», in I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, and J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of 
Epistemology, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 131-179. 
STICH, S. 
1990 The Fragmentation of Reason. Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press. 
1993 «Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospect for Pragmatism», in C. 
Hookway and D. Peterson (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1-17. 
WEINBERG, J., NICHOLS, S., AND STICH, S. 
2001 «Normativity and epistemic intuitions», Philosophical Topics 29, 429-460. 
 
